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Defendant-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS FROM TWO ORDERS OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Captola Murdock, Jane C. Hinckley, Russell N. Stansfield, Lyle D. Hatch, Melvin L.
Whiting, David and Ruth M. Fuller, William C. and Paula O. Jones and A. Bert and Julia A.

Cherrington (hereinafter "Petitioners"), by and through their counsel of record, respectfully
submit their Reply Brief of Appellants.
ARGUMENT
IL

THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION AND ADDENDUM VIOLATE
SECTION 73-4-11 BECAUSE, AS THE STATE ENGINEER
ACKNOWLEDGES, THEY DO NOT INCORPORATE THE HARDING
DECREE'S PROVISIONS REGARDING MS. MURDOCK'S DECREED
RIGHT ON SPRING CREEK.

When preparing a proposed determination of water rights and distributing waters
thereunder, the state engineer must follow standing decrees regarding those rights: "[I]f the right
to the use of said waters has been theretofore decreed or adjudicated said waters shall be
distributed in accordance with such decree until the same is reversed, modified, vacated or
otherwise legally set aside." Utah Code Ann. §73-4-11 (1953)(emphasis added). In the State
Engineer's Addendum1 to the Proposed Determination, he does not include or even describe Ms.
Murdock's decreed rights on Spring Creek under the Harding Decree. The Addendum strays
from the Harding Decree which has not been "reversed, modified, vacated or otherwise legally
set aside." The Addendum thus violates Section 73-4-11.
The state engineer acknowledges that the Addendum describes Ms. Murdock's rights
only on Hobble Creek: "Consequently, the State Engineer found (and so recommended in the
Addendum) that the water rights are supplied from Hobble Creek where the water is actually
diverted into the Highline Canal and placed to beneficial use on Petitioners' and other lands
below." Brief of Appellee State Engineer ("Engineer's Brief) at 12 (emphasis added). Yet,
Judge Harding granted Ms. Murdock rights on Spring Creek and Hobble Creek. The Harding
2

The defined terms described in petitioners' statement of facts are used and incorporated in
this brief. S££ Petitioners' Brief of Appellants at 1-19.
2

Decree provides:
That based upon the beneficial use of the waters and water rights arising
out of Spring Creek and Hobble Creek, and as augmented by 30.5 shares of
Strawberry Reservoir water since prior to 1903 as said water has been used on the
aforesaid land for irrigation, the plaintiffs be and are hereby awarded a first class
water right as is hereinafter defined, for the irrigation of the 39 irrigable acres of
above-described land.
R.794. Judge Harding expressly held that Ms. Murdock never exchanged her water right on
Spring Creek with Springville, and he quieted title to water on Spring Creek and Hobble Creek in
Murdock:
7. That the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title to said water rights
have never transferred any of such water or water rights to either of the defendants

10. That defendants have no right, title or interest in and to the said water
and water rights of plaintiffs . . . .
11. That plaintiffs are entitled to a Decree, quieting in them all right, title
and interest in and to the said water and water rights of Spring Creek and Hobble

Creek —
R.612-13. Emphasis added. Further, while the Harding Decree shows that Springville attempted
to use different water in an effort to replace water taken from petitioners, Judge Harding
understandably recognized and emphasized that such a replacement or exchange did not alter
petitioner's water rights on Spring Creek. Indeed, Judge Harding quieted title in the water and
water right on Spring Creek and Hobble Creek in Ms. Murdock. R.605,613. Thus, because the
Addendum only recognizes Ms. Murdocks' rights on Hobble Creek, and fails to acknowledge or
provide for her decreed rights on Spring Creek, the Addendum is contrary to the Harding Decree
and violates Section 73-4-11.

3

II.

BECAUSE THE OTHER PETITIONERS5 WATER RIGHTS WERE NOT
ADJUDICATED UNDER THE HARDING DECREE AS CONCEDED BY
THE STATE ENGINEER, THEIR WATER RIGHTS AND OBJECTIONS
TO THE ADDENDUM WERE NOT PRECLUDED BY THE HARDING
DECREE.

Springville contends that the water user claims and objections to the Proposed
Determination and Addendum of petitioners other than Ms. Murdock are precluded by the
Harding Decree even though the other petitioners were not parties in that case. Springville's
argument runs this way: because, they say, the other petitioners "are in privity with Captola
Murdock and her predecessors by reason of their ownership of this acreage and their being longterm beneficiaries under the exchange. Thus, under the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel, the Harding Decree clearly applies to Petitioners' objections to the Addendum." Brief
of Appellee Springville Municipal Corporation ("Springville's Brief) at 33. This is wrong.
Murdock and the other petitioners obtained their rights from a common grantor, A.W.
Cherrington, who owned 74.06 acres. R. 2093. While Murdock certainly is in privity with the
common grantor, as are the other petitioners, Murdock and the other petitioners are not in privity
with each other as they each own adjoining, separate parcels. R.4386-89.
The Harding Decree only decreed water rights on Ms. Murdock's 39 acres of land, (R.
608), and not the entire 74.06 acres owned by the common grantor. R. 604, ^[1, s££ Springville's
Brief at 32. The State Engineer concedes that the Harding Decree only applied to Ms.
Murdock's land: "[T]he State Engineer's survey found that the Captola Murdock Water User's
Claim 51-6211 was beneficially used on 38.22 acres (Addendum, p.5, R. 4386) which matches
the 39 acres awarded under paragraph 2 of the Harding Decree. (R.604)." Engineer's Brief at

4

12.2 Therefore, the Harding Decree did not adjudicate any neighboring lands or water rights
owned by the other petitioners.
Despite the Harding Decree's description of Ms. Murdock's land and water rights alone,
the Addendum incorrectly provides that the remaining petitioners' water rights were also
i

adjudicated in the Harding Decree, it disallows the other petitioners' claim that they own water
on Spring Creek, it redesignates their source of water as Hobble Creek and it precludes their
water user claims and objections to the Proposed Determination allegedly all because of the
Harding Decree.3 While purporting to reserve many issues for trial in its pretrial order, the trial
court later summarily confirmed the Addendum and precluded all of the water user claims and
virtually all of the petitioners' objections to the Addendum and Proposed Determination by
virtue of its prior order of summary judgment which purported to incorporate the provisions of
the Harding Decree. R. 1952, 2478-82, 2524-25.
As shown above, the Harding Decree did not preclude Ms. Murdock's water user claims
and objections to the Proposed Determination and Addendum. Instead it confirms Ms.
Murdock's claims and objections. Further, the Harding Decree did not preclude the remaining
I
petitioners' water user claims and objections to the Proposed Determination and Addendum
because it only adjudicated Ms. Murdock's water right associated with her land. R. 608. The
I
Sse als& R. 794 ("the plaintiffs be and are hereby awarded a first class water right as is
hereinafter defined, for the irrigation of the 39 irrigable acres of above-described land.")
2

3

The Addendum purports to have the petitioners, other than Murdock, divert from Hobble
Creek only and not from Spring Creek, allegedly because their claims were "adjudicated in Murdock
v. City of Springville, Utah County Civil No. 22850". R. 4387-4389(emphasis added). However,
the other petitioners claim that their source is Spring Creek. S££ claims of A. Bert and Julia
Cherrington, R. 129; LDS Church, R.156; Lyle D. Hatch, R. 151; Melvin L. Whiting, R. 146; David
and Ruth Fuller, R.336; William C. and Paula O. Jones, R.341; Russell Stansfield, R.163; Jane
Hinckley, R. 167.
5

Harding Decree only applied to the 39 acres owned by Ms. Murdock as found by Judge Harding
in the Harding Decree. R. R. 604, 608. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly found that the water
user claims and objections of the other petitioners were precluded. R. 1952, 2478-82, 2524-25.
Finally, neither the State Engineer nor Springville have disputed that the other petitioners
were parties to the Harding Decree. Further, it is undisputed that these other petitioners never
executed an exchange agreement with Springville. R.2063-65. Accordingly, the trial court erred
when it ruled that the Harding Decree precluded the other petitioners' water user claims and
objections. The trial court erred when it refused to reconsider and modify paragraph 5 of its prior
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the Petitioners other than Ms.
Murdock.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE SECTION 734-24 PETITION BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS SUBMITTED
UNREFUTED AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY THAT THE STATE ENGINEER
FAILED TO INFORM ALL PARTIES WHO HAD AFFECTED WATER
RIGHTS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 73-4-11.

In the prior appeal in this case, this Court stated:
The trial court's discretion should be exercised with the objective of
providing the plaintiffs with a reasonably prompt resolution of the issues raised in
their section -24 petition. If the court can do so by holding a hearing on the
objections made by the plaintiffs to the engineer's addendum, which raises
identical issues, then the court would not abuse its discretion by holding that
hearing and dismissing the section -24 petition. If, however, there will be an
unreasonable delay in obtaining hearing on the objections (because they are part
of the general adjudication suit), then the trial court should proceed to hear the
section -24 petition.
Because the record before us does not disclose whether the trial court can
with reasonable promptness hear the objections, we reverse the dismissal of
Plaintiffs' section -24 petition and remand this case to the trial court to make that
determination and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Murdock v. Springville Municipal Corporation, 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). The trial

6

court improperly dismissed petitioners' Section 73-4-24 petition in the face of unrefuted affidavit
evidence submitted by petitioners which established that all claimants to Hobble Creek water
have not been notified of the Proposed Determination in violation of Sections 73-4-3 and 73-411. R.627-32, Affidavits of W. Jay Smart, Arthur D. Johnson, Ray Cope, Roger L. Singleton,
Mary Frandsen, Larry M. Rawle. Section 73-4-11 requires that notice of the general adjudication
and the state engineer's Proposed Determination be given to all claimants of Hobble Creek water
by the State Engineer. See Utah Code Ann. §73-4-11. Springville failed to submit any affidavit
or other evidence which contradicts Petitioners' affidavits. Therefore, the affidavits submitted by
petitioners establish that such notice was not given.
Neither Springville nor the State Engineer now cites any evidence which rebuts or
contradicts the affidavit testimony submitted by petitioners. They cannot, because neither
rebutted this testimony in the trial court. Instead, the State Engineer now callously argues that
petitioners and others who never received notice of the pendency of the action are not prejudiced!
Engineer's Brief at 9. They ignore why the notice required under Section 73-4-11 is critical.
Downstream users may claim an interest in the very water which is at issue in this case. The
purpose of the statute is to summon all interested parties to one forum to resolve all claims made
to the same water. See Section 73-4-11. Where some parties admittedly were not notified as
required — parties alleging that they too have water rights on Hobble Creek — the trial court
cannot simply brush aside the State Engineer's failure to discharge his duties under Section 73-411. In the absence of notice and an opportunity to be heard to defend their water rights, these
interested and affected parties might properly move to set aside the Court's decision regarding
the Proposed Determination and Addendum. Indeed, because the Proposed Determination and
Addendum purport to adjudicate rights on Hobble Creek which are upstream from Plat A, the
7

Plat A water users, including affiants, must be given notice that the Proposed Determination and
Addendum are pending. See Statement of Facts in petitioners' Brief of Appellants at 1fl|5-13. If
any interested person can contest the determination of water rights on Hobble Creek after
Springville and petitioners have received an adjudication of their rights, petitioners will have
needlessly spent all of their attorney fees in this action as the matter may need to be retried. This
prejudice meets the requirements of Plain City v. Hooper Trr. Co., 51 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah
1935).4
As stated in petitioners' opening brief, the Addendum and Proposed Determination
improperly address the claims of Springville which were not timely filed. Petitioners' Brief at
28-29. This is further error because the Addendum allows Springville to divert water to which it
is not entitled because its claims were not timely filed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
DENIED PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
TO RECONSIDER.

Springville argues that petitioners' motion for summary judgment and to reconsider
invoked the trial court's discretion under Timm v. Dewsnup. Petitioners were entitled to
demonstrate to the Court on summary judgment that petitioners never executed any exchange
agreement, deed or other instrument which transferred petitioners' water rights on Spring Creek
to Springville. Indeed, petitioners submitted the third affidavit of Robert Murdock, a civil
engineer with thirty years experience in water rights. Mr. Murdock testified that he spent many

4

Springville also argues that petitioners did not advance their petition. However, this was
not a ground for dismissal recognized by the trial court. R. 1941-46. Further, petitioners stated that
they had pursued settlement of these claims with Springville. R. 1207-71. Under Utah Oil v. Harris.
565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977), the petitioners should not be punished for their attempts to settle
this action.
8

hours researching the petitioners' claims and found that no written instrument, court decree or
order transferred any of petitioners' rights on Spring Creek to Springville. R. 2062-65. Mr.
Murdock's testimony in his third affidavit confirming plaintiffs water rights was not stricken
and is uncontroverted before the trial court and this Court. R. 2062-65. Springville failed to
submit any contrary evidence to the trial court when it decided this motion.5 Under Rule 56(e),
Utah R. Civ. P., Springville failed to respond with specific facts showing a genuine issue for
trial. Accordingly, under Rule 56, the trial court should have entered judgment against
Springville.
To the extent that the trial court could invoke any discretion to consider petitioners'
motion for summary judgment and to reconsider, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider uncontro verted testimony in the third affidavit of Robert Murdock. Springville admits
that the facts in Murdock's affidavit were "established" because of SpringviUe's inaction.6
Springville then argues that petitioners failed to demonstrate that these facts were different from
those of Mr. Murdock's prior affidavits or failed to show how this evidence required the trial
court to grant petitioners' motion. SpringviUe's Brief at 40. Mr. Murdock's affidavit established
that no court order or no written agreement exists whereby Springville could acquire any of
petitioners' water rights on Spring Creek. R. 2062-65. In SpringviUe's prior motion, petitioners
stated that the Harding Decree did not memorialize an exchange agreement nor did they ever
5

Springville further failed to comply with Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, because it failed to state with specificity "those portions of the record upon which
[it] relies" as argued by petitioners below. R. 2134-35. Accordingly, under Rule 4-501 (2)(b) these
facts were established and admitted by Springville and the State Engineer.
6

"First, [petitioners] claim that Springville failed to rebut certain material facts alleged in
their motion to reconsider and suggest the facts that were established justified granting their motion."
SpringviUe's Brief at 39-40 (emphasis added).
9

execute any document for an exchange of water. The previous affidavit did not specify whether
the petitioners had executed an agreement with Springville. R. 1043-44. Further, the prior
affidavit was stricken by the trial court and was therefore not considered. Further, Mr. Murdock
indicates that he has spent extensive time reviewing "deeds and agreements recorded at the Utah
County Recorder's Office, reviewing documents and microfilm at the office of the state engineer,
reviewing the water user claims of Objectors, researching the records, minutes and agreements
made by Springville Municipal Corporation in the office of Springville Municipal Corporation,
and reviewing the limited number of documents held by certain Objectors' in their personal
records" to determine the validity of petitioners' claims. R. 2063-64. Because the prior affidavit
was not considered, and because of Mr. Murdock's referenced research of petitioner's claims
which demonstrated an utter lack of evidence of any exchange between Springville and
petitioners, Mr. Murdock's third affidavit was new and material as suggested under Timm v.
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d at 1185.7 Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied petitioners' motion
for summary judgment and to reconsider.
V.

SPRINGVILLE FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN THAT ANY OF THE
PETITIONERS WERE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING THEIR WATER USER CLAIMS AND OBJECTIONS TO
THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION.

Springville failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
7

Springville also assails petitioners' citation of Mt. Olivet Cemetery Association v. Salt Lake
City, 235 P. 876 (Utah 1925). However, it is interesting to note that in that case, as here, the alleged
exchange involved "no more than that there were some exchanges made without indicating how
many water users made exchanges or the quantity of water exchanged." Id. at 878; see alsG
Montgomery v. Berrett, 121 P. 569 (Utah 1912)(Court held that evidence of terms of parol contract
for exchange of water were insufficient: "There can be no contract, unless the minds of the parties
have met and mutually agreed." Id. at 570. Here, Judge Harding examined the claims of Springville
and held in the Harding Decree that Ms. Murdock and her predecessors "never transferred any of
such water or water rights to either of the defendants." R. 605.
10

applies. Petitioners' Brief at 26-27. Springville erroneously claims that petitioners "fail[] to
identify the burden of proof that Springville allegedly failed to meet." Springville's Brief at 37.
However, under Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993), cited and relied upon by
Springville and the trial court, this Court held that the party invoking the doctrine of collateral
estoppel has the burden of proof to establish the elements of the doctrine, including the burden to
show that the issues previously decided are identical to those issues in the present action. Brief
of Appellants at 26. Petitioners demonstrated that their objections were not precluded by the
Harding Decree because Springville failed to raise or discuss "any similarity or difference
between the objections asserted by the petitioners in this general adjudication and the facts
adjudicated in the Harding Decree." Brief of Appellants at 26. Indeed, the Harding Decree
firmly supports Ms. Murdock's objections as she asserts rights to water on Spring Creek which
Judge Harding's Decree confirmed. R. 603-613, 793-95, 2059. Therefore, looking beyond
Springville's bald assertion, Springville has failed to carry its burden to show that issues decided
by Judge Harding in his decree were identical to all issues of all the petitioners' objections.
Indeed, as shown above, the Harding Decree only addressed Ms. Murdock's claims to water from
Spring Creek and cannot preclude the remaining petitioners' water user claims and objections
because the remaining petitioners have different land and water rights than the rights of Ms.
Murdock which were addressed in Judge Harding's decree.
Springville's and the State Engineer's remaining arguments are answered by the
argument and record evidence cited in petitioners' opening brief and will not be restated here.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error when it denied all of petitioners' water claims
and objections to the Addendum and Proposed Determination based upon its mistaken reading of
11

the Harding Decree. The Harding Decree confirmed Ms. Murdock's rights on Spring Creek and
Hobble Creek and did not adjudicate or discuss any of the other petitioners' water rights. The
trial court erred when it ignored the affidavits of several claimants of Hobble Creek water who
are affected by the State Engineer's Proposed Determination and Addendum who testified that
they had not been notified of the pendency of the Proposed Determination and Addendum as
required pursuant to Section 73-4-11. Because of the State Engineer's failure to discharge his
statutory duties, notice must be sent to all claimants and Petitioners' claims cannot be adjudicated
within a reasonable time in the general adjudication case. Finally, as explained in the opening
brief, the trial court incorrectly struck Mr. Murdock's initial affidavits filed in opposition to
Springville's motion to dismiss the Section 73-4-24 petition and in opposition to Springville's
motion for summary judgment apparently on the basis that the affidavit allegedly contained
argument, hearsay and speculation. However, the affidavit referred to and incorporated exhibits
which were official government publications and copies of the court file and cited letters between
the parties showing that the reason for delay in pursuing the Section -24 petition was because of
settlement negotiations.
This Court should reverse the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs Section 73-4-24
petition, paragraph 5 of the June 4, 1996 order granting Springville's motion for partial summary
judgment, the denial of petitioners' motion for partial summary judgment and motion to
reconsider and the entire March 4, 1997 order entered in favor of Springville. This Court should
then enter judgment in favor of petitioners and confirm their objections to the Proposed
Determination and Addendum and remand this case with instructions to confirm petitioners'
water user claims as filed, incorporate petitioners' water user claims into the Proposed
Determination and Addendum and deny Springville's water user claims as filed and described in
12

the Proposed Determination and Addendum.
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